Consequências sobre o bem-estar econômico devido a erros persistentes sobre predições climáticas nos mercados de seguro contra perigos naturais
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-41614922grlPalavras-chave:
Incerteza climática, Aversão ao risco, Contratos de Seguro, Inundação fluvial, Probabilidade subjetivaResumo
Este artigo estuda as consequências da fricção entre dois grupos de agentes econômicos, com e sem expectativas racionais, sobre o bem-estar econômico em um mercado de seguro incompleto. Utilizando modelagem econométrica, validamos essa fricção empiricamente e testamos a existência de heterogeneidade adicional na probabilidade de pertencimento ao grupo que comete erros persistentes sobre a antecipação de eventos climáticos futuros. Os modelos econométricos sugerem adicionalmente que essa probabilidade varia significativamente por atributos sociodemográficos dos indivíduos e por atributos geofísicos de seus locais de residência. Com base nessas evidências, desenvolvemos um modelo de seguro privado de dois períodos sob incerteza com preços endógenos. Ao incluir um planejador central, o qual provê uma tecnologia para obtenção de informação precisa, nosso exemplo ilustra que a intervenção pública (via tributação) somente seria factível se o gasto público na provisão dessa tecnologia não excedesse 9.188% da renda agregada gerada pelos agentes com expectativas adaptativas.
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Referências
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Arnott, R., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1990. “The welfare economics of moral hazard”. In: Louberge H (ed) Risk, information and insurance: essays in the memory of Karl Borch. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp. 91–121.
Atkison, Anthony B., and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1972. "The structure of indirect taxation and economic efficiency." Journal of Public economics 1(1): 97-119.
Blume, Lawrence, and David Easley. 2006. "If you're so smart, why aren't you rich? Belief selection in complete and incomplete markets." Econometrica 74(4): 929-966.
Crocker, Keith J., and Arthur Snow. 1985. "The efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information." Journal of Public economics 26(2): 207-219.
Caillaud, Bernard, et al. 1988. "Government intervention in production and incentives theory: a review of recent contributions." The Rand Journal of Economics 1-26.
Dasgupta, Partha. 2008. "Discounting climate change." Journal of risk and uncertainty 37(2-3): 141-169.
De Long, J. Bradford, et al. 1990. "Noise trader risk in financial markets." Journal of political Economy 98(4): 703-738.
Dionne, Georges, and Louis Eeckhoudt. 1985. "Self-insurance, self-protection and increased risk aversion." Economics Letters 17(1-2): 39-42.
Dionne, Georges et al. (Ed.). 2000. Handbook of insurance. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Ehrlich, Isaac, and Gary S. Becker. 1972. "Market insurance, self-insurance, and self-protection." Journal of political Economy 80(4): 623-648.
Grothmann, Torsten, and Fritz Reusswig. 2006. "People at risk of flooding: why some residents take precautionary action while others do not." Natural hazards 38(1-2): 101-120.
Grothmann, Torsten, and Anthony Patt. 2005. "Adaptive capacity and human cognition: the process of individual adaptation to climate change." Global Environmental Change 15(3): 199-213.
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Guedes, G., R. Raad, and L. Vaz. 2015. “Modeling and measuring protective action decisions under flood hazards in Brazil.” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, San Diego, USA.
Hajat, Shakoor, et al. 2014. "Climate change effects on human health: projections of temperature-related mortality for the UK during the 2020s, 2050s and 2080s." J Epidemiol Community Health 68(7): 641-648.
Harvey, Andrew C., and P. H. J. Todd. (1983). "Forecasting economic time series with structural and Box-Jenkins models: A case study." Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 1(4): 299-307.
Kahneman, Daniel. 1979. “Prospect theory: An analysis of decisions under risk.” Econometrica 47: 278.
Kievik, Milou, and Jan M. Gutteling. 2011. "Yes, we can: motivate Dutch citizens to engage in self-protective behavior with regard to flood risks." Natural hazards 59(3): 1475.
Kunreuther, Howard C., Mark V. Pauly, and Stacey McMorrow. 2013. Insurance and behavioral economics: Improving decisions in the most misunderstood industry. Cambridge University Press.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jean Tirole. 1987. "Comparative statics of the optimal dynamic incentive contract." European Economic Review 31(4): 901-926.
Lakdawalla, Darius, and George Zanjani. 2005. "Insurance, self-protection, and the economics of terrorism." Journal of Public Economics 89(9-10): 1891-1905.
Light, Audrey, and Taehyun Ahn. 2010. "Divorce as risky behavior." Demography 47.4 (2010): 895-921.
Lutz, Wolfgang, Raya Muttarak, and Erich Striessnig. "Universal education is key to enhanced climate adaptation." Science 346.6213 (2014): 1061-1062.
Magnan, Serge. 1995. "Catastrophe insurance system in France." Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance. Issues and Practice 474-480.
Mirlees, James A. 1971. "An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation." The review of economic studies 38(2): 175-208.
Parker, Wendy S. 2010. "Predicting weather and climate: Uncertainty, ensembles and probability." Studies in history and philosophy of science part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41(3): 263-272.
Picard, Pierre. 1987. "On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection." Journal of public economics 33(3): 305-331.
Pidgeon, Nick, Roger E. Kasperson, and Paul Slovic, eds. 2003. The social amplification of risk. Cambridge University Press.
Prato, Tony. 2008. "Accounting for risk and uncertainty in determining preferred strategies for adapting to future climate change." Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 13(1): 47-60.
Regan, Helen M., et al. 2005. "Robust decision‐making under severe uncertainty for conservation management." Ecological applications 15(4): 1471-1477.
Rothschild, Micheal, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1976. "Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets." Quarterly Journal of Economics 90(4): 629-649.
Savage, Leonard J. 1951. "The theory of statistical decision." Journal of the American Statistical association 46(253): 55-67.
Shao, Wanyun, et al. 2014. "Weather, climate, and the economy: Explaining risk perceptions of global warming, 2001–10." Weather, Climate, and Society 6(1): 119-134.
Sjögersten, Sofie, et al. 2013. "Responses to climate change and farming policies by rural communities in northern China: a report on field observation and farmers’ perception in dryland north Shaanxi and Ningxia." Land Use Policy 32: 125-133.
Snow, Arthur. 2011. "Ambiguity aversion and the propensities for self-insurance and self-protection." Journal of risk and uncertainty 42(1): 27-43.
Terpstra, Teun, and Michael K. Lindell. 2013. "Citizens’ perceptions of flood hazard adjustments: an application of the protective action decision model." Environment and Behavior 45(8): 993-1018.
Yohe, Gary, Natasha Andronova, and Michael Schlesinger. 2004. "To hedge or not against an uncertain climate future?." Science 305(5695): 416–417.
Zaalberg, Ruud, et al. 2009. "Prevention, adaptation, and threat denial: Flooding experiences in the Netherlands." Risk Analysis: An International Journal 29(12): 1759-1778.
Arnott, R., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1990. “The welfare economics of moral hazard”. In: Louberge H (ed) Risk, information and insurance: essays in the memory of Karl Borch. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp. 91–121.
Atkison, Anthony B., and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1972. "The structure of indirect taxation and economic efficiency." Journal of Public economics 1(1): 97-119.
Blume, Lawrence, and David Easley. 2006. "If you're so smart, why aren't you rich? Belief selection in complete and incomplete markets." Econometrica 74(4): 929-966.
Crocker, Keith J., and Arthur Snow. 1985. "The efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information." Journal of Public economics 26(2): 207-219.
Caillaud, Bernard, et al. 1988. "Government intervention in production and incentives theory: a review of recent contributions." The Rand Journal of Economics 1-26.
Dasgupta, Partha. 2008. "Discounting climate change." Journal of risk and uncertainty 37(2-3): 141-169.
De Long, J. Bradford, et al. 1990. "Noise trader risk in financial markets." Journal of political Economy 98(4): 703-738.
Dionne, Georges, and Louis Eeckhoudt. 1985. "Self-insurance, self-protection and increased risk aversion." Economics Letters 17(1-2): 39-42.
Dionne, Georges et al. (Ed.). 2000. Handbook of insurance. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Ehrlich, Isaac, and Gary S. Becker. 1972. "Market insurance, self-insurance, and self-protection." Journal of political Economy 80(4): 623-648.
Grothmann, Torsten, and Fritz Reusswig. 2006. "People at risk of flooding: why some residents take precautionary action while others do not." Natural hazards 38(1-2): 101-120.
Grothmann, Torsten, and Anthony Patt. 2005. "Adaptive capacity and human cognition: the process of individual adaptation to climate change." Global Environmental Change 15(3): 199-213.
Groves, R. M. et al. 2011. Survey Methodology. [S.l.]: John Wiley & Sons.
Guedes, G., R. Raad, and L. Vaz. 2015. “Modeling and measuring protective action decisions under flood hazards in Brazil.” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, San Diego, USA.
Hajat, Shakoor, et al. 2014. "Climate change effects on human health: projections of temperature-related mortality for the UK during the 2020s, 2050s and 2080s." J Epidemiol Community Health 68(7): 641-648.
Harvey, Andrew C., and P. H. J. Todd. (1983). "Forecasting economic time series with structural and Box-Jenkins models: A case study." Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 1(4): 299-307.
Kahneman, Daniel. 1979. “Prospect theory: An analysis of decisions under risk.” Econometrica 47: 278.
Kievik, Milou, and Jan M. Gutteling. 2011. "Yes, we can: motivate Dutch citizens to engage in self-protective behavior with regard to flood risks." Natural hazards 59(3): 1475.
Kunreuther, Howard C., Mark V. Pauly, and Stacey McMorrow. 2013. Insurance and behavioral economics: Improving decisions in the most misunderstood industry. Cambridge University Press.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jean Tirole. 1987. "Comparative statics of the optimal dynamic incentive contract." European Economic Review 31(4): 901-926.
Lakdawalla, Darius, and George Zanjani. 2005. "Insurance, self-protection, and the economics of terrorism." Journal of Public Economics 89(9-10): 1891-1905.
Light, Audrey, and Taehyun Ahn. 2010. "Divorce as risky behavior." Demography 47.4 (2010): 895-921.
Lutz, Wolfgang, Raya Muttarak, and Erich Striessnig. "Universal education is key to enhanced climate adaptation." Science 346.6213 (2014): 1061-1062.
Magnan, Serge. 1995. "Catastrophe insurance system in France." Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance. Issues and Practice 474-480.
Mirlees, James A. 1971. "An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation." The review of economic studies 38(2): 175-208.
Parker, Wendy S. 2010. "Predicting weather and climate: Uncertainty, ensembles and probability." Studies in history and philosophy of science part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41(3): 263-272.
Picard, Pierre. 1987. "On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection." Journal of public economics 33(3): 305-331.
Pidgeon, Nick, Roger E. Kasperson, and Paul Slovic, eds. 2003. The social amplification of risk. Cambridge University Press.
Prato, Tony. 2008. "Accounting for risk and uncertainty in determining preferred strategies for adapting to future climate change." Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 13(1): 47-60.
Regan, Helen M., et al. 2005. "Robust decision‐making under severe uncertainty for conservation management." Ecological applications 15(4): 1471-1477.
Rothschild, Micheal, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1976. "Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets." Quarterly Journal of Economics 90(4): 629-649.
Savage, Leonard J. 1951. "The theory of statistical decision." Journal of the American Statistical association 46(253): 55-67.
Shao, Wanyun, et al. 2014. "Weather, climate, and the economy: Explaining risk perceptions of global warming, 2001–10." Weather, Climate, and Society 6(1): 119-134.
Sjögersten, Sofie, et al. 2013. "Responses to climate change and farming policies by rural communities in northern China: a report on field observation and farmers’ perception in dryland north Shaanxi and Ningxia." Land Use Policy 32: 125-133.
Snow, Arthur. 2011. "Ambiguity aversion and the propensities for self-insurance and self-protection." Journal of risk and uncertainty 42(1): 27-43.
Terpstra, Teun, and Michael K. Lindell. 2013. "Citizens’ perceptions of flood hazard adjustments: an application of the protective action decision model." Environment and Behavior 45(8): 993-1018.
Yohe, Gary, Natasha Andronova, and Michael Schlesinger. 2004. "To hedge or not against an uncertain climate future?." Science 305(5695): 416–417.
Zaalberg, Ruud, et al. 2009. "Prevention, adaptation, and threat denial: Flooding experiences in the Netherlands." Risk Analysis: An International Journal 29(12): 1759-1778.
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25-06-2019
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Copyright (c) 2019 Gilvan Ramalho Guedes, Rodrigo Raad, Lucélia Raad
Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
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O detentor dos direitos autorais da revista é o Departamento de Economia da Faculdade de Economia, Administração, Contabilidade e Atuária da Universidade de São Paulo.
Dados de financiamento
-
Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico
Números do Financiamento 472252/2014-3 -
Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de Minas Gerais
Números do Financiamento CSA-APQ-00244-12 -
Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico
Números do Financiamento 483714/2012-7 -
Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de Minas Gerais
Números do Financiamento CSA-PPM-00305-14
Como Citar
Guedes, G. R., Raad, R., & Raad, L. (2019). Consequências sobre o bem-estar econômico devido a erros persistentes sobre predições climáticas nos mercados de seguro contra perigos naturais. Estudos Econômicos (São Paulo), 49(2), 235-264. https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-41614922grl
