Ressemblance et Participation chez Platon

Abstract

In this text we propose to clarify the problem of participation in Plato, namely the causal relationship between the Ideas and the sensible objects. If the existence of a causal relation between image and model is easy to find, the nature of the relationship is aporetic, a source of perplexity. This statement is a reason to suppose that the dilemma of participation and the criticism of Ideas in the Parmenides that depend on it, are put neither as trivial fallacies nor fatal objections, but as problems to be solved.The solution that we suggest is that the separation between Ideas and the sensible objects is not a symmetrical relation: sensibles are wholly dependant images of Ideas, they are neither individual nor substantial. The separation is not a symmetrical relation, because the Ideas are separate from sensibles in that they are capable of existing apart from sensibles; sensibles are not separate from Ideas in that they are incapable of existing apart from Ideas.