https://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/gateway/plugin/WebFeedGatewayPlugin/atomJournal of Ancient Philosophy2023-10-25T01:15:55-03:00Fernando Gazonifilosofiaantiga@usp.brOpen Journal Systems<p>The <em>Journal of Ancient Philosophy</em> is an e-journal published by the Department of Philosophy of the Universidade de São Paulo (USP, Brazil). It was founded in 2007 and publishes articles, reviews and textual notes on ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, as well as translations of classical texts into Portuguese or Spanish. The journal also intends to provide information about Latin American symposia, meetings and conferences on ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. It is published twice a year, in May and October.</p> <p>The purposes for which the Journal of Ancient Philosophy was created are to foster classical studies in Latin America, providing scholars a vehicle for the publication of researches and discussions, and to promote international dialogue across different languages and approaches. It is open to all scholars worldwide to submit contributions for inclusion in this Journal. The accepted languages are: Portuguese, Spanish, English, French, German and Italian. Every contribution is evaluated by a double-blind, peer-review process.</p> <p>This Journal considers plagiarism as a very serious offense against academic research, and consequently will take all measures to protect its publications from it, aiming at ensuring originality in any paper published by this Journal. This Journal will not condone plagiarism under any circumstances. Please report to <a href="http://www.fapesp.br/6566" target="_blank" rel="noopener">www.fapesp.br/6566</a> for a theoretical assessment of plagiarism, and <a href="http://www.fapesp.br/6574" target="_blank" rel="noopener">www.fapesp.br/6574</a> for practical and general information on sound academic practices of quotation and publication. We fully agree with the proposals put forward by Fapesp in these documents. </p> <p> </p> <p><em><strong>Abstracted / Indexed in: </strong><a href="http://philindex.org/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Philosopher's Index</a>, </em><a href="http://www.latindex.unam.mx/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Catálogo LatinIndex</a>, <a href="http://www.ebscohost.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EBSCOhost</a>, <a href="http://www.periodicos.capes.gov.br/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Portal de Periódicos da CAPES</a>, <a href="http://qualis.capes.gov.br/"%20target="_blank" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Qualis CAPES</a></p> <p> </p> <p><a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/" rel="license"><img style="border-width: 0;" src="https://i.creativecommons.org/l/by-nd/4.0/80x15.png" alt="Creative Commons License" /></a><br />This work is licensed under a <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/" rel="license">Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License</a>. </p> <p> </p>https://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/215696Some remarks against non-epistemic accounts of immediate premises in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics2023-10-31T20:18:09-03:00Breno Zuppolini
<p>Most interpretations of Aristotle’s <em>Posterior Analytics</em> believe that the term ‘ameson’ is used to describe the principles or foundations of a given system of justification or explanation as epistemically prior to or more fundamental than the other propositions in the system. Epistemic readings (as I shall call them) arguably constitute a majority in the secondary literature. This predominant view has been challenged by Robin Smith (1986) and Michael Ferejohn (1994; 2013), who propose interpretations that should be classified as non-epistemic according to the definition above. My aim in this article is purely negative. I intend to show that these non-epistemic interpretations are liable to serious objections and are in conflict with some important features of Aristotle’s theory of demonstration.</p>
2023-10-31T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2023 Breno Zuppolinihttps://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/208632Entre ética e ciência: necessidade e contingência na teoria da ação em Aristóteles2023-12-04T11:26:53-03:00Jaqueline Stefani
<p>This article investigates the possibility of moral issues being of the same nature as that of occurrences for the most part (<em>ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ</em>) which are discussed in the Physics, in the Metaphysics and in the Analytics, as opposed to the categories of what happens by strict necessity and by chance/accident. That category (<em>ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ</em>) sometimes seem to be approximately equivalent to that which happens by strict necessity, when Aristotle highlights that things that happen by chance/accident do not belong to the scope of science, and sometimes seem to be sharply distinct of strict necessity, when Aristotle specifies the differences between both of them in terms of possible conclusions that may be obtained from syllogisms of both types. It seems to be that actions resulting from a formed character are <em>ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ</em>, thusly belonging to the register of hypothetical necessity, since character is the agent’s second nature. If this hypothesis is correct, actions resulting from a formed character do not have the status of openness to contraries. </p> <p> </p>
2023-10-31T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2023 Jaqueline Stefanihttps://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/196863O ponto de intersecção entre compostos naturais propriamente e não propriamente substanciais em Aristóteles2023-12-04T11:24:27-03:00Rodrigo Romão de Carvalho
<p>Throughout the <em>Metaphysics</em> and the treatises on natural philosophy, Aristotle takes organisms as the paradigmatic examples of natural <em>οὐσίαι</em> (substances). However, in addition to living organisms, in certain passages the philosopher also mentions the living and the elements as examples of substances. However, in other passages, Aristotle seems to consider that the parts of living beings and elementary bodies do not genuinely represent entities, substantial entities. On the other hand, at no time does the philosopher seem to expressly indicate the inanimate homogeneous bodies (metals and minerals), treated in book IV of the <em>Meteorology</em>, as types of <em>substantial</em> beings. In this article, then, I intend to examine whether the parts of the living being and the elements could, in fact, count or not as genuine examples of natural substances; and to what extent inanimate homogeneous bodies, despite not being explicitly mentioned in the condition of substantial beings, could, from the examination of their compositional natures, sustain, in a strict way, the title of natural <em>οὐσίαι</em>.</p>
2023-10-31T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2023 Rodrigo Romão de Carvalhohttps://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/212452A Note on Aristotle’s De Anima Α 1, 403a10-162023-06-02T14:01:37-03:00Orestis Karasmanis
<p>In this paper I discuss passage 403a10-16 from Aristotle’s <em>De Anima</em>. In this passage Aristotle deals with whether the soul could be separate from the body and presents an analogy with geometrical entities. This passage is highly obscure and it presents many textual difficulties. The interpretation I offer resolves the textual problems without requiring emendations to the text as many commentators suggest.</p>
2023-05-31T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2023 Orestis Karasmanishttps://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/212451Percepción Moral y Conocimiento Práctico en el Estoicismo2023-06-02T14:00:07-03:00Christian Pineda
<p>In a paper published in 1998, Ricardo Salles argues that the Stoic theory of action cannot account for practical knowledge, i.e., knowledge about what action is appropriate to be carried out in certain circumstances. The aim of this paper is to propose a solution to this problem. For this aim, I argue that the Stoics developed a perceptual theory of moral knowledge. According to this theory, the moral properties instantiated in objects, people, and actions are known through perception. After explaining this theory, I argue that it allows us to show that the Stoics deemed perception as a source of practical knowledge.</p>
2023-05-31T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2023 Christian Pinedahttps://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/212450The Problem of Modal Upgrading in Aristotle’s Apodictic Syllogistic2023-06-02T13:56:24-03:00David Botting
<p>This is another contribution to the unending controversy over the two Barbaras. My approach to the problem is hopefully quite new: I wish to view the issue through the prism of modal upgrading. Modal upgrading occurs when a subject term that has only been predicated of assertorically in the premises is predicated of apodictically either: i) in the conclusion of a given syllogism, or; ii) in some proposition that is derived from either the premises of the given syllogism alone or the premises in combination with other propositions that do not refer to the proposition’s subject term. I call the proposition after it has been upgraded the upgraded proposition.</p> <p>When a conclusion is the upgraded proposition, it is obviously a different predicate being predicated than was predicated in the premises. Aristotle endorses this kind of upgrading; it is effectively what happens in any valid mixed modal syllogism when the minor premise is not apodictic (e.g., Barbara LXL).</p> <p>In other cases the upgraded proposition is not a conclusion but still follows from the premises alone. In these cases it is the same predicate being predicated in the upgraded proposition as in the premises, although the quantity of the propositions are different (one is universal, another particular). Aristotle rejects this kind of upgrading and takes its occurrence as sufficient to deny the validity of the given syllogism (e.g., Barbara XLL).</p> <p>I will describe a third type where both the predicate remains the same and the quantity of the proposition remains the same as in the premise, e.g., the upgrading of “All C are B” to “All C are necessarily B”. In these cases it will turn out that the upgraded proposition is not derived from the premises alone, or at least, not syllogistically from the premises alone. This kind of upgrading too is reason for denying the validity of any syllogism from which the upgraded proposition follows as a consequence. I will show that Barbara LXL entails this kind of modal upgrading and should be rejected for this reason.</p> <p>Armed with this notion of modal upgrading I want to attack the problem of the two Barbaras in Aristotle’s apodictic syllogistic. Aristotle himself endorses mixed modal Barbara when the major is necessary and the minor is assertoric, thereby endorsing the first kind of modal upgrading, but rejects Barbara when the minor is necessary and the major is assertoric on the grounds that it leads to the second kind of modal upgrading. Theophrastus endorses the <em>peioram rule</em> which rejects both Barbaras on the grounds that the conclusion can only be as strong as the weakest premise. Łukasiewicz endorses both Barbaras. I will argue that <em>both</em> Barbaras lead to unacceptable modal upgrading and should be taken to be invalid for that reason. Hence, I agree with Theophrastus about the two Barbaras; however, I do not endorse the <em>peioram rule</em> because I think that the negative mixed modal syllogisms generally avoid this problem and is mostly correct.</p>
2023-05-31T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2023 David Botting https://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/212449How Does Aristotle Understand the Paradox of the Meno?2023-06-02T13:53:44-03:00Nathan Elvidge
<p>I focus on the distinction between universal and particular knowledge or knowledge simpliciter in APr 2.21 and APo 1.1 as Aristotle’s explicit response to the paradox of the <em>Meno</em>. I attempt to derive a picture of Aristotle’s understanding of the philosophical problem underlying that paradox by asking what that problem would have to be in order for this distinction to make sense as a response to it. I consider two ways of taking the distinction, and argue that both point towards a problem about deriving knowledge of particulars from knowledge of universals as the fundamental problem underlying Aristotle’s understanding of the <em>Meno</em> paradox.</p>
2023-05-31T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2023 Nathan Elvidgehttps://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/212448Temporal Truth and Bivalence: an Anachronistic Formal Approach to Aristotle’s De Interpretatione 92023-06-02T13:51:17-03:00Luiz Henrique Lopes dos Santos
<p>Regarding the famous Sea Battle Argument, which Aristotle presents in <em>De Interpretatione </em>9, there has never been a general agreement not only about its correctness but also, and mainly, about what the argument really is. According to the most natural reading of the chapter, the argument appeals to a temporal concept of truth and concludes that not every statement is always either true or false. However, many of Aristotle’s followers and commentators have not adopted this reading. I believe that it has faced so much resistance for reasons of hermeneutic charity: denying the law of universal bivalence seems to be overly disruptive to logical orthodoxy – the kind of logical orthodoxy represented by what we now call classical propositional logic, much of which Aristotle clearly supports in many texts. I intend to show that the logical-semantic theses that the traditional reading finds in <em>De Interpretatione </em>9 are much more conservative than they may seem to be at first glance. First, I will show that they complement, and do not contradict in any way, the orthodox definitions of the concepts of truth and statement that Aristotle advances in other texts. Second, by resorting in an anachronistic vein to concepts and methods peculiar to contemporary logic, I will show that a trivalent modal semantics conforming to those theses can be built for a standard formal language of the classical propositional calculus. It is remarkable that reasonable concepts of logical truth and logical consequence that may be defined on the basis of this trivalent modal semantics are coextensive with their orthodox counterparts, the concepts of tautology and tautological consequence of classical bivalent and extensional semantics.</p>
2023-05-31T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2023 Luiz Henrique Lopes dos Santoshttps://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/212447Learning through Love: A Lover’s Initiation in the Symposium2023-06-02T13:52:18-03:00Paul Woodruff
<p>In the <em>Symposium</em> of Plato, Socrates reports that Diotima once described to him a process of initiation by which a lover rises from desiring one beautiful body to catching sight of what seems to be the Platonic form of beauty. Scholars have debated whether the lover is to make this ascent by a rational process or a non-rational one, or by both working either in concert or independently. This paper argues that love leads and guides a process in this initiation that necessarily involves rational activity. No teaching is necessary or appropriate, so that the process is an example of learning without being taught. The philosophical insight that results is life-changing, but it does not amount to the kind of knowledge that would fully satisfy a Socratic seeker after knowledge.</p>
2023-05-31T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2023 Paul Woodruff https://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/212443Callicles as a Potential Tyrant in Plato's Gorgias2023-06-02T13:47:06-03:00Daniel R. N. Lopes
<p>This essay argues that Callicles is depicted by Plato in the <em>Gorgias</em> as a <em>potential</em> tyrant from a psychological standpoint. To this end I will contend that the Calliclean moral psychology sketched at 491e-492c points towards the analysis of the tyrannical individual pursued by Plato in books VIII and IX of the <em>Republic</em> based upon the tripartite theory of the soul. I will thereby attempt to show that (i) in the <em>Gorgias</em>, Callicles does not actually personify the ideal of the superior person advocated by himself insofar as he is still susceptible to shame, as evinced by Socrates' cross-examination (494c-495a); and that (ii) looking forward to the <em>Republic</em>, he can be understood for this same reason as being precisely on the threshold between the democratic and the tyrannical soul.</p>
2023-05-31T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2023 Daniel R. N. Lopeshttps://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/205887On Becoming Fearful Quickly: A Reinterpretation of Aristotle’s Somatic Model of Socratean akrasia. 2023-10-31T20:18:09-03:00Brian Andrew Lightbody
<p><em>The Protagoras</em> is the touchstone of Socrates’ moral intellectualist stance. The position in a nutshell stipulates that the proper reevaluation of a desire is enough to neutralize it.<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a> The implication of this position is that <em>akrasia </em>or weakness of will is not the result of desire (or fear for that matter) overpowering reason but is due to ignorance. </p> <p>Socrates’ eliminativist position on weakness of will, however, flies in the face of the common-sense experience regarding <em>akratic</em> action and thus Aristotle was at pains to render Socrates’ account of moral incontinence intelligible. The key improvement Aristotle makes to Socrates’s model is to underscore that the conditioning of the akratic’s body plays a critical role in determining the power of one’s appetites and, accordingly, the capacity of one to resist the temptations these appetites present for rational evaluation. As Aristotle puts it, “For the incontinent man is like the people who get drunk quickly and on little wine, i.e., on less than most people.” (1151a 3-4). Aristotle presents what I shall call a somatic paradigm (i.e. the drunkard analogy) in order to tackle the problem of <em>akrasia</em> and it is this somatic solution that marks a significant improvement over Socrates’s intellectualist or informational model or so the tradition tells us.</p> <p>In this paper, I wish to push back on the above Aristotelian explanation. I argue that when one fully examines Socrates’ account of weakness of will that Aristotle’s solution is less effective than is traditionally thought. In fact, Socrates can bring Aristotle’s model into his own; just as Aristotle absorbs what is right about Socrates’s model, namely, that akratic action utilizes reason but to a limited degree, Socrates in <em>Meno</em> (77C-78A) develops his own somatic model of weakness of will that connects to the intellectualist paradigm of the <em>Protagoras</em>. To achieve this <em>rapprochement</em> between the two models, I zero in on the description provided by Socrates of those individuals who desire bad things knowing they are bad as “ill-starred” or “bad spirited” (κακοδαίμων ). The “bad-spirited” is the coward and, in contrast to Aristotle’s drunkard, becomes fearful quickly from little danger. This additional somatic component, when connected to Socrates’s position on <em>akrasia </em>in<em> Protagoras </em>adds a new twist to Socrates’s model in the following way: while no one wishes to be ill-starred such that more harm than good will befall one, one may become so as a result of the bad choices one knowingly makes.</p> <p> </p> <p><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> “After him came Socrates, who spoke better and further about this subject, but even he was not successful. For he used to make the virtues into sciences, and this is impossible. For the sciences all involve reason, and reason is to be found in the intellectual part of the soul. So that all the virtues, according to him arise in the rational part of the soul. The result is that in making the virtues into sciences he is doing away with the nonrational part of the soul and is thereby doing away with passion and character…” (Aristotle, <em>Magna Moralia</em> 1.1. 1182 a15-26)</p>
2023-10-31T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2023 Brian Andrew Lightbodyhttps://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/204222O justo cívico em Ethica Nicomachea V.62023-12-04T11:30:21-03:00André Luiz Cruz Sousa
<p>The present study aims at understanding how <em>Ethica Nicomachea</em> V.6 relates to its preceding chapters, V.1-5. On the one hand, the interpreter wonders for what purpose Aristotle introduces a topic named ‘the civic just’ (<em>to politikon dikaion</em>) in V.6, since V.1-5 treats extensively of matters of justice in the city. On the other hand, the same text posits that there is a certain ‘just without qualification’ (<em>to haplōs dikaion</em>), which may or may not be the civic just itself; compared to the just without qualification, other forms of just are so by similitude (<em>kath’homoiteta</em>). In attempting to clear the confusion around those two points, the present study proposes the following: (1) the civic just is the just without qualification insofar as it is the primordial form of the just, in which only humans who are cumulatively free, equals and self-sufficient have a share; (2) the description of the civic just recapitulates several aspects of the discussions of justice in V.1-5 – the laws, the kinds of equality, rule, the legal suit - because the civic just encompasses all the forms of just (<em>dikaion</em>) related to the virtues of universal justice (V.1) and partial justice (V.2-5); (3) the expression <em>to politikon dikaion</em> is introduced in V.6 in order to contrast everything treated in V.1-5 with the domestic just, <em>to oikonomikon dikaion</em>, mentioned for the first time in V.6; (4) the forms of the domestic just are just only by similitude with the civic just because justice loses density outside the civic sphere, a situation which can be explained by the shortcomings Aristotle ascribes to women, children and slaves in EN V.6 (lack either of freedom or equality or yet self-sufficiency) as well as in <em>Politica</em> I (varying degrees of defective deliberation and virtue).</p>
2023-10-31T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2023 André Luiz Cruz Sousahttps://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/203164Ricardo Salles (ed.), Cosmology and Biology in Ancient Philosophy. From Thales to Avicenna, New York (N.Y.), Cambridge University Press, 2021.2022-10-06T17:58:08-03:00Nélio Gilberto dos Santos2022-10-06T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2022 https://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/203163El Comentario de Miguel de Éfeso a PA A1 en el Origen Griego de la Rama Biológica de la Tradición Aristotélica2022-10-06T17:58:08-03:00Eduardo H. Mombello
<p>In <em>De partibus animalium</em> A1, Aristotle presents —in a darker than usual way— decisive details of the methodology he devised for his science of nature. His indications seem to point the path along which Aristotelian biology should travel. However, numerous textual and systematic difficulties have given rise to a number of conflicting interpretations, in the context of a vigorous stream of philosophical research and debate since the last third of the last century. In this stream of studies, Michael of Ephesus’s commentary on <em>PA</em> and his views on the subject remain relatively ignored. A complex multiplicity of factors seems to support the lack of sufficient consensus among leading contemporary specialists to explicitly consider those contributions. The purpose of this paper is to examine several of these factors and, based on the evidence provided by little explored aspects of Michael’s texts, to offer arguments in favor of that consensus against a number of alternatives. I shall argue that the contributions of this late commentator deserve to be considered —<em>mutatis mutandis</em>— as seriously as it is done with the main ancient Greek commentaries; in particular, in the philosophical studies of those who are currently interested in that methodology or are engaged in Aristotelian biology.</p>
2022-10-06T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2022 https://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/203162Erôs and Intelligible Desire in Plotinus’ Enneads2022-10-06T17:58:08-03:00Maria Kristina Papanidi
<p>In <em>Ennead </em>III.5 <em>On Love,</em> Plotinus' discussion of <em>erôs </em>is underlined by Plato’s discourse on love in the <em>Symposium </em>and the <em>Phaedrus</em>.<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a> Plotinus conceives <em>erôs </em>as a purified power, which directs the soul to the intelligible realm of beauty and the world of the Forms.<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">[2]</a> Modern scholarship considers the Plotinian <em>erôs </em>as an ascending power that is <em>always</em> directed to the higher realm of the Forms and never to the lower perceptible realm. Throughout the <em>Enneads</em>, the soul is described as purely and originally an intelligible entity in all its manifestations and expressions (ex. <em>Ennead </em>IV.8).<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">[3]</a> Plotinus particularly supports a dual aspect theory of the soul, in which the homogenous <em>psychē </em>consists of two interrelated aspects - a higher intelligible part related to Intellect, and a lower perceptible part related to the sensible bodies (Caluori, 2015; Remes, 2007; Stamatellos, 2013; Stern-Gillet, 2009). However, limited attention has been paid to the intelligible aspects of the soul's desire in Plotinus' conception of <em>erôs</em>. In this context, this paper aims to revisit the view that Plotinus completely refuted the desire of the physical bodies, and consequently refuted <em>erôs</em> as a power directed to the lower perceptible realm (Ferwerda, 1965; Friedländer, 1964; Hadot, 1963; Wallis, 1995). It is argued that in light of the soul's intelligibility, desire also has an intelligible aspect when it is directed, along with the power of love, to the earthly realm and thus the true intelligible beauty of the perceptible bodies is recognized.</p> <p> </p> <p><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> Hereafter, all quotations from Plotinus’ <em>Enneads </em>will solely refer to Armstrong’s (1966-1988) translations.</p> <p><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a> See Bertozzi (2012, 2021); Tatarkiewicz (1980); Wallis (1995); Wiitala (2013), Vasilakis (2021).</p> <p><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a> For Plotinus’ theory of the soul, see his treatises in <em>Ennead </em>IV. Also see Blumenthal (1971) and Caluori (2015).</p>
2022-10-06T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2022 https://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/203160Física e Metafísica no Estoicismo Antigo2022-10-06T17:58:08-03:00Guy Hamelin
<p>The Stoic School takes up the tripartite division of philosophy of the post-Platonic Academy, in which physics occupies, alongside dialectics and ethics, a prominent place. In this tripartition, there is no metaphysics, nor in the two subdivisions of Stoic physics. For the thinkers of the Stoa, there is nothing beyond physics. In spite of this statement, we try to discover, in this article, the presence of a study devoted to first philosophy among the various topics investigated by the Stoics in their physics. It is with this aim that we first examine what precisely Aristotle deals with in the <em>Metaphysics</em>. This preliminary investigation will serve as a point of reference for determining what can be considered as metaphysics, at least in ancient Greece. Afterwards, we are interested in the Stoic view of nature itself since nothing superior exists. This examination leads us to scrutinize the Stoic conception of the Good, a notion closely linked to the subject of physics. We then take a good look at each one of the topics found in the two Stoic divisions of physics, highlighting the matters approaching Aristotelian metaphysics. On that occasion, a specific analysis is devoted to the two Stoic principles, due notably to the relevance of the subject in relation to first philosophy. From the diversity of the elements found in the course of our study, we come to the final part, in which we establish the position of the Stoic School on metaphysics.</p>
2022-10-06T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2022 https://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/203159Aitiai as Middle Terms2022-10-06T17:58:09-03:00Boris Hennig
<p>Aristotle’s <em>aitiai</em> (‘causes’) are middle terms in Aristotelian syllogisms. I argue that stating the <em>aitia</em> of a thing therefore amounts to re-describing this same thing in an alternative and illuminating way. This, in turn, means that a thing and its <em>aitiai</em> really are one and the same thing under different descriptions. The purpose of this paper is to show that this view is implied by Aristotle’s account of explanation, and that it makes more sense than one might expect.</p>
2022-10-06T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2022 https://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/203158Aristóteles, Primeiros Analíticos II, 23: Não Há Indução Completa2022-10-06T17:58:09-03:00Tomás Troster
<p>This article examines the very atypical case of <em>epagoge</em> in <em>Prior Analytics </em>II, 23, aiming to situate it in the general framework of Aristotle’s conception of induction and in his epistemology. Besides offering a translation and a detailed commentary of the chapter, I have reassembled some of the main theories that support its character of exception – as if the philosopher were defending the existence of a “complete induction” – and then I close the article by refuting such theories, supported by other texts, such as <em>Topics</em> I, 8, and <em>Posterior Analytics</em> I, 5.</p>
2022-10-06T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2022 https://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/203157O Anel de Gyges nos Devaneios de Rousseau 2022-10-06T17:58:09-03:00Luiz Maurício Bentim da Rocha Menezes
<p>The present work aims at studying the myth of Gyges’ ring from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s work <em>The Reveries of a solitary Walker</em>. Gyges’ ring is a magic artefact, allowing its bearer to be visible or invisible according to his will. The ring’s myth is portraited for the first time in the Second Book of Plato’s <em>Republic</em>. Thusly, our article is divided in two parts: the first one presents an analysis of the <em>Republic</em> observing its challenge of justice and the relation it holds with the art of ruling; the second part presents an investigation of Rousseau’s work to show how he had absorbed the ring’s myth. The main objective of our work is the comparison between Plato’s and Rousseau’s view of Gyges’ ring, and the investigation of the concept of nature as one of the pillars of the social contract theory. As results we present the way Rousseau answers to the challenge of justice from the concept of justice within the soul, whereas no harm could be done to others. In his reflexion on the ring, Rousseau seems to point at the existence of an interior justice according to its “natural inclination”, opposite to any obligation of the positive law among men. Therefore, one needs to observe that Rousseau is defending justice according to the natural rights holding that any contract established among men should be according to nature. This agrees with our thesis of a possible political ontology based on firstly, the concept of a universal justice, and secondly, on the art of ruling according to justice.</p>
2022-10-06T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2022 https://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/203155L’identità ‘noetico-ontica’ nel poema parmenideo (B3 e B8,34)2022-10-06T17:58:09-03:00Vittorio Ricci
<p>B3 represents one of Parmenides’ most complex and enigmatic texts. Its doxographic tradition is both very scarce and very late, but above all involved in theological (Christian) schemes (Clement of Alexandria) or in metaphysical (pagan) research (Plotin and Proclus). Both Clement and Plotin, the only witnesses quoting B3, are not unreliable. The goodness of their quotation is not in doubt and the contexts in which the fragment is quoted provide some clues suitable for promoting acknowledging its original sense, even if understanding Parmenides’ notion of identity between νοεῖν and εἶναι in theological or Neoplatonic perspective has been judged little acceptable. Through syntactic, morphological, semantic, and intertextual observations Parmenides’ concept of τὸ αὐτό has emerged as an essential point in order to grasp the being. At the end of the analysis B8,34 unanimously deemed as the unique parallel with B3 has been examined and interpreted as an emphatical reaffirmation of the aforesaid noetic-ontic identity, which because of its own immanent, permanent peculiarity is the only reason for the exclusive possibility of νόημα</p>
2022-10-06T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2022 Vittorio Riccihttps://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/203154 The Dynamic Conception of Being in the First Philosophers and the Notion of φύσις2022-10-06T17:58:09-03:00Nestor-Luis Cordero
<p>According to Aristotle, the "object" of study of the first philosophers was the φύσις. Even though the term appears for the first time in Heraclitus, the early answers to the question "what is the 'being' of τὰ ὄντα" present already it as a source of active and dynamic life, according to the etymology of φύσις. This is the meaning in Homer (<em>Od. </em>X.303), and this is also the case of water (Thales), air (Anaximenes), and the γόνιμα contained in the φύσις ἄπειρον (Anaximander, <em>apud </em>Ps.-Plutarch). The φύσις of Heraclitus inherits this meaning, because, for him, reality, "changing, is at rest" (fr. 84a). </p>
2022-10-06T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2022 https://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/201055Linguistic (and Ontological?) encounters between Plato and Karl Popper2023-10-31T20:18:10-03:00Terezis Christos
<p>In this study, I attempt to shed light on whether some passages from the Platonic dialogue <em>Cratylus </em>that deal with language correspond to Karl Popper’s theory on the third world. Specifically, I attempt to prove that Plato’s third world contains both divine and human properties, something that is provided through language, that is, through the human rational and developing in objective terms construction. In the four subchapters of my study, I basically investigate the relationship between the thinking subject and the noumenon as well as the role of the coiner of names and the dialectician with respect to the scientific foundation of the names. The most important conclusion drawn is that according to Plato these two are responsible for connecting a thinking subject with a noumenon by adding objective certainty to the meaning of everything is said. I also investigate how Plato’s archetypal Ideas could be considered to be the third world.</p>
2023-10-31T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2023 Terezis Christoshttps://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/196701Heraclitus on Analogy: a Critical Note2022-04-28T14:23:03-03:00Giannis Stamatellos2022-04-21T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2022 Giannis Stamatelloshttps://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/196699Daniel and the Control2022-04-27T15:36:57-03:00Michael Witty2022-04-21T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2022 Michael Wittyhttps://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/196697The Relation of the ‘Forms’ with the ‘Parts’ and the ‘Elements’ in Damascius the Neoplatonist: Epistemological Foundations2022-04-26T08:21:48-03:00Christos TerezisLydia Petridou
<p>In this study, we investigate the way in which Damascius describes the relation of the ‘forms’ with the ‘parts’ and the ‘elements’ in his treatise <em>De Principiis </em>(II 174.1-176.7), in which he utilizes aspects of the Pre-Socratic natural philosophy as well as Aristotle’s <em>Physica</em>. We also shed light on the epistemological terms and conditions of his analysis. From a methodological point of view, we follow the categorical schemas found in the text, which reflect the philosopher’s general positions with respect to the formation of the natural world, through which a particularly advanced and mathematically expressed natural science for studying the structures of the universe is revealed. Considering that Damascius’ main research goal is to analytically describe the general archetypical categories of the sensible world, the greatest conclusion that we draw is that the formation of the natural world came from the activation-composition of the ‘elements’, that is, the material projections, in their separations, of the productive manifestations of the metaphysical archetypal Ideas.</p>
2022-04-21T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2022 Christos Terezis, Lydia Petridouhttps://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/196696Proclus on the Forms as Paradigms in "Plato’s Parmenides: the Neoplatonic Response to Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Criticisms"2022-04-28T14:21:57-03:00Melina Mouzala
<p>This paper sets out to analyze Proclus’ exegesis of Socrates’ suggestion in <em>Parmenides</em> 132d1-3 that Forms stand fixed as patterns (παραδείγματα), as it were, in the nature, with the other things being images and likenesses of them. Proclus’ analysis of the notion of being pattern reveals the impact of the Aristotelian conception of the form as paradigm on his views, as we can infer from Alexander of Aphrodisias’ and Simplicius’ explanation of the paradigmatic character of the Aristotelian form. Whereas Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias refute the efficient causality of the Platonic Forms and support that μέθεξις is just a metaphor, Syrianus, Proclus and Asclepius defend the Platonic theory, and specifically Proclus, who brings to the fore the multilateral role of the Forms as patterns with regard to the secondary things of this realm.<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a></p> <p> </p> <p><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> An earlier version of this paper was presented at the <em>Symposium Platonicum</em> XII: Plato’s<em> Parmenides</em>, organized by the International Plato Society, Paris, 15-19 July 2019.</p>
2022-04-21T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2022 Melina Mouzalahttps://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/196695Los Antecedentes Presocráticos de la Teoría Estoica de Conflagración 2022-04-27T15:35:07-03:00Ricardo Salles
<p>In this paper, I explore the Presocratic antecedents of the Stoic theory of conflagration and argue that, even though three central theses of this theory have solid antecedents in Presocratic physics, the logical connection between them is a Stoic innovation. I label the Presocratics who hold these theses ‘Anaximandreans’ and include in this group Anaximander himself , Heraclitus and Diogenes of Apollonia, and reveal that Anaximenes, Democritus and Antiphon share with them central meteorological and cosmological assumptions.</p>
2022-04-21T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2022 Ricardo Salleshttps://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/196693Argumentos y Explicaciones en De Caelo 22022-04-26T08:15:55-03:00Fabián MiéManuel Berrón
<p>The main concern of this paper is the problem of method in <em>De Caelo</em> (Book 2 and some related treatises), which has been recently invigorated by the supposition of Aristotle’s acceptance of two standards of justification. Whereas the φυσικῶς argument comes close to demonstrative knowledge, the εὐλόγως argument relies on more general assumptions and allegedly points towards argumentative justification (sometimes associated with dialectic). With a view to better understanding how empirical criteria for theories, teleological principles, and the resolution of difficulties are laid down to provide as much causal explanations as possible, we take side here in the debate about the very purpose of Aristotle’s using of justification by argument in scientific contexts. Our main claim is that although only reasonable proofs can be worked out in empirically underdetermined domains, this in no way amounts to endorsing an alternative to the norms of inquiry Aristotle upholds in natural science.</p>
2022-04-21T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2022 Fabián Mié, Manuel Berrónhttps://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/196691Contradiction, Being, and Meaning in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Gamma2022-04-27T15:33:37-03:00Pascal Massie
<p>This paper focuses on Aristotle’s discussion of PNC in <em>Metaphysics</em> Gamma and argues that the argument operates at three different levels: ontological, doxastic, and semantic through the invocation of three philosophical personae: the first one (the philosopher) can only <em>state</em> what is otherwise unprovable, the second one (a geometer) can only <em>confirm</em> that we should trust PNC, the third one (a sophistical opponent) <em>denies</em> PNC and must be silenced. Aristotle cannot prove what is beyond proof. This situation results in a fundamental ambiguity in the figure of <em>the</em> philosopher. The <em>Metaphysics</em> is written from the standpoint of an investigative thinker who admits her puzzlement before a question that will forever remain open and imagines another philosopher who has achieved a god-like insight into the first principles of all things. The path from the first figure to the second one, however, remains an enigmatic leap.</p>
2022-04-21T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2022 Pascal Massiehttps://revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga/article/view/196690Dioecismo y Ciudad Ideal. Acerca de la República de Platón, VII 540e4-541a1 2022-04-27T15:31:31-03:00David Xavier Lévystone
<p>The radical mean suggested by Socrates in order to carry out the program of the <em>Republic</em> - the relegation to the fields of all inhabitants over the age of 10 - has perplexed modern commentators who have seen in it an ironical remark, a <em>reductio ad absurdum </em>presented in order to establish the very impossibility of Kallipolis or, on the contrary, a sign of the totalitarian and criminal character of the Platonic city. But it is far from evident, in view of political or military events prior and contemporary with the redaction of the <em>Republic</em>, that this solution could offend the moral conscience of fourth-century Greeks. This practice even seems to be the logical consequence of a certain oligarchic or aristocratic ideology, common by the end of the 5<sup>th</sup> c. and at the beginning of the 4<sup>th</sup> c., which associated, on the one hand, rural organization with the ‘best regime’ and, on the other, urban centralisation with democracy. The actual practices of the Lacedaemonian city, which maintained its primitive organization in <em>komai</em>, and even tried to impose it to other cities, could also serve as a model for the opponents of Athenian democracy. All of Plato's political models, from the <em>Republic</em> to the <em>Laws</em>, present cities whose essential, if not exclusive, productive activity is agriculture. The displacement of the population to the countryside seems, from this perspective, a rather serious proposal of the philosopher. <a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">*</a></p> <p> </p> <p><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">*</a> Agradezco a Héctor Zagal y a María-Elena García-Peláez por sus observaciones y sugerencias al texto en español. </p>
2022-04-21T00:00:00-03:00Copyright (c) 2022 David Xavier Lévystone