THEORY OF IDEAS, INNATISM AND THEORY OF PERCEPTION IN DESCARTES

Authors

  • William de Jesus Teixeira Universidade de Brasília, Brasília

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2447-9012.espinosa.2016.117756

Keywords:

Theory of ideas, Innatism, Theory of perception, Rationalism, Epistemology, Descartes.

Abstract

This paper deals with the so-called Cartesian ‘epistemological turn’. Taking the old term ‘idea’ to be the core of his metaphysics, Descartes deployed it in a new way. In fact, Descartes broke with the traditional Platonic-Augustian conception of ‘ideas’ as ontological beings. In his view, ideas are mental or psychological entities. Descartes advances this position in accordance with a revolutionary theory of perception and a new conception of mind, both outcomes of his denial of scholastic empiricism. What emerges from this is a revival of the doctrine of innate ideas, which shapes the philosophical debates in the second half of the seventeenth-century and is responsible for the rise of epistemology or theory of knowledge as an autonomous discipline.

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Author Biography

  • William de Jesus Teixeira, Universidade de Brasília, Brasília
    Graduando, Universidade de Brasília

Published

2016-12-24

Issue

Section

Artigos

How to Cite

Teixeira, W. de J. (2016). THEORY OF IDEAS, INNATISM AND THEORY OF PERCEPTION IN DESCARTES. Cadernos Espinosanos, 35, 487-515. https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2447-9012.espinosa.2016.117756