Kripke’s metaphysical necessity: a Kantian perspective

Authors

  • Ediovani Antônio Gaboardi Universidade Federal da Fronteira Sul

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2318-9800.v26i1p33-48

Keywords:

Kripke, Kant, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Necessity

Abstract

This article studies the concept of necessity in Kripke’s Naming and Necessity. Kripke distinguishes metaphysical from epistemological necessity. So, neoclassical and neo-empiricist positions are both wrong, because they remain in the epistemological realm. In Kripke, the epistemology becomes a psychological investigation about individual knowledge. It cannot deal with the problem of justification, and therefore cannot explain why there are necessarily true propositions. When he tries to do this, he falls into the trap of dialectics, as Kant warned. Finally, the article defends that the metaphysical domain is just an abstraction based on an objective epistemology.

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References

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Published

2021-06-28

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Section

Articles

How to Cite

Kripke’s metaphysical necessity: a Kantian perspective. (2021). Cadernos De Filosofia Alemã: Crítica E Modernidade, 26(1), 33-48. https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2318-9800.v26i1p33-48