L’étude de la cognition: vers une perspective incarnée

Auteurs

DOI :

https://doi.org/10.1590/0103-6564e210099

Mots-clés :

enactivisme, théories énactives, cognition 4E, interaction, théories incarnées

Résumé

Le domaine de la cognition a connu une longue histoire dans laquelle les modèles formels, le corps et l’interaction avec le monde physique et social ont eu des significations et des rôles variés. Ces dernières années, des propositions ont tenté de réintroduire le corps et la variabilité cognitive résultant de la sensibilité à des contextes riches et imprévisibles. Cet article présente l’enactivisme autopoïétique, l’une des versions essentielles des théories incarnées au sein des sciences cognitives, en soulignant certaines limites des théories classiques du traitement de l’information et de leurs notions de représentation. Avec cet écartement, les sciences cognitives ont récupéré le corps, la sensibilité et la flexibilité des processus cognitifs, la nature dynamique de l’expérience et la valeur des systèmes culturels qui soutiennent l’activité cognitive.

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2024-04-05

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L’étude de la cognition: vers une perspective incarnée. (2024). Psicologia USP, 35, e210099. https://doi.org/10.1590/0103-6564e210099