Representation and Phenomenalism in the Critique of Pure Reason
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2318-9800.v24i1p151-172Keywords:
Representation, Phenomenalism, Spatial objects, Mental entities, Transcendental idealismAbstract
Kant has often been accused of being a phenomenalist, i.e., of reducing spatial objects to representations that exist only in our minds. I argue against this reading. Given Kant’s claim that appearances are mere representations, the only way to avoid the accusation of phenomenalism is to provide an alternative conception of “representation” according to which the claim that something is a mere representation does not entail that it is a mere mental item (or an organized collection of mental items). I offer evidence that Kant does not conceive of representations as mental items and outline an alternative conception of representations.
Downloads
References
Allais, L. (2015). Manifest Reality – Kant’s Idealism and his Realism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Allison, H. (1973). Kant’s Critique of Berkeley. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 11(1), pp.43–63.
Beiser, F. (2002). German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Caranti, L. (2007). Kant and the scandal of philosophy: the Kantian critique of Cartesian scepticism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Guyer, P. (1987). Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. (1998). Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. (2004). Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Translated by Gary Hatfield. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Strawson, P. (1966). The Bounds of Sense. New York: Routledge.
Smith, N.K. (2003 [1918]). A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
Turbayne, C. (1955). Kant’s Refutation of Dogmatic Idealism. Philosophical Quarterly, 5, pp. 225–44.
Van Cleve, J. (1999). Problems from Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Information and conceptions on the texts are complete responsibility of the authors.
All the articles submitted before July 5th 2018 and those published after July 2021 are licensed under a CC BY-NC-ND license – except those published between the aforementioned dates, which are under the CC BY-NC-SA license. The permission for the translation of the material published under the license CC BY-NC-ND by third parts can be obtained with the consent of the author.
Open access policies - Diadorim
Rules applied before July 5th 2018:
Presenting a submission to our Editorial Board implies granting priority of publication for “Cadernos de filosofia alemã”, as well as transferring the copyright of texts (once published), which will be reproduced only with the manifest authorization of the editors. Authors keep the right to reuse the texts published in future editions of their work, without paying any fees to "Cadernos”. We will not grant the permission to re-edit or translate the texts for third parts without agreement of the author.