Aristotle on Joint Perception and Perceiving that We Perceive
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v13i1p147-180Palavras-chave:
Aristóteles, De Anima, percepção, consciênciaResumo
While most interpreters take the opening of De Anima III 2 (“Since we perceive that we see and hear […]”) to be an oblique reference to some sort of conscious awareness, I argue that Aristotle intends to explain what I call ‘joint perception’: when conjoined with Aristotle’s subsequent claim that perceiving and being perceived are the same activity, the metaperception underpins the perception of a unified object. My interpretation is shown to have a more satisfactory account of the aporiai that follow. While I argue that the immediate focus of the metaperceptual account is joint perception, it may also be applicable to other kinds of complex (i.e. non-special) perception, which I briefly consider in the closing section.
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