Perspectivism in philosophy of science: a case-study in quantum physics

Authors

  • Décio Krause Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia
  • Jonas Rafael Becker Arenhart Universidade Federal da Fronteira Sul; Departamento de Filosofia

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1590/S1678-31662013000100008

Abstract

In this article we present a particular view of the development of scientific theories which (following Ortega y Gasset), we term "perspectivism". Making use of this view, we discuss how we can accommodate distinct and apparently incompatible descriptions of a supposed reality under investigation. We distinguish between a "reality" (R) and its "empirical description", (Re). Acknowledging that we can have diverse empirical descriptions of the same reality, we discuss the particular case in which the view is applied to current debates on the ontology of quantum physics, especially of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. As it is well known, this theory is compatible with treating quantum objects either as individuals or as non-individuals. Both ontologies are possible and deserve to be developed. We propose that the perspectivism developed here is neutral not only with respect to the choice of an ontology, but also concerning the debates among realists and anti-realists in the philosophy of science. We conclude that to go beyond the pluralism accepted by perspectivism, and to adopt realism or anti-realism, involves commitment to strong theses about the relation between reality and its descriptions.

Published

2013-03-01

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

Perspectivism in philosophy of science: a case-study in quantum physics . (2013). Scientiae Studia, 11(1), 159-183. https://doi.org/10.1590/S1678-31662013000100008